Recent Developments: Le Marc\u27s Management Corp. v. Valentin: Actual Knowledge of a False Statement Is Required for an Award of Punitive Damages in Defamation Action by Shane, Steven E.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 29
Number 1 Fall 1998 Article 13
1998
Recent Developments: Le Marc's Management
Corp. v. Valentin: Actual Knowledge of a False
Statement Is Required for an Award of Punitive
Damages in Defamation Action
Steven E. Shane
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shane, Steven E. (1998) "Recent Developments: Le Marc's Management Corp. v. Valentin: Actual Knowledge of a False Statement Is
Required for an Award of Punitive Damages in Defamation Action," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 29 : No. 1 , Article 13.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol29/iss1/13
Recent Developments 
Le Marc's Management Corp. v. Valentin 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
punItIve damages were not 
recoverable in a defamation action 
where the plaintiff could not prove 
that the defendant acted with 
actual knowledge that a particular 
defamatory statement was false. 
Le Marc's Management Corp. v. 
Valentin, 359 Md. 645, 709 A.2d 
1222 (1998). In prior defamation 
actions, the court generally 
allowed punitive damages based 
on defamatory statements made 
with actual malice or conscious, 
deliberate, or reckless disregard for 
the truth. The court modeled the 
new standard for punitive damages 
in defamation cases after the 
standard applied in other tort 
actions. 
In late 1987, Francisco 
Valentin ("Valentin") moved from 
Puerto Rico to New York City and 
became employed as a stock room 
clerk at Le Marc's Fifth Avenue 
Cards, Inc. ("Le Marc's"). In May 
1988, upon learning ofthefts at the 
store, Le Marc's administered 
polygraph tests to its Hispanic 
employees, including Valentin. 
Valen'..in's test was judged 
inconclusive due in part to the 
language barrier. However, the 
examiner also reported to Robert 
Sauer, Le Marc's corporate 
administrator, that he believed 
Valentin was withholding 
information. Shortly thereafter, 
Valentin decided to leave Le 
Marc's. Valentin submitted a 
letter of resignation to his manager 
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and, in return, received a letter of 
recommendation. Valentin 
relocated to Maryland where he 
was hired as a teller-trainee for 
Sovran Bank. The bank sought 
references from Valentin's past 
employers, including Le Marc's. 
Upon receiving the bank's request, 
Sauer consulted his records and 
returned a reference documenting 
that Valentin had been terminated 
from Le Marc's due to pilferage. 
The bank suspended Valentin and 
gave him four days to clear his 
reference from Le Marc's or he 
would be terminated. 
Valentin immediately 
contacted Sauer who promised to 
investigate Valentin's employment 
record. In a private meeting with 
Valentin, Sauer agreed that the 
information contained in the 
reference letter was inaccurate and 
that Valentin had not been 
terminated for pilferage. 
Nevertheless, the second version 
of the reference the bank received 
from Sauer did not clear Valentin's 
name, but instead undermined his 
overall credibility. The letter 
implied that Valentin had been 
engaged in "covering something 
up." As a result of this report, the 
bank terminated Valentin for 
"falsifying" his employment 
application. This action rendered 
him ineligible for future 
employment with the bank. 
Valentin filed a defamation 
action against Le Marc's in the 
Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County. A jury awarded Valentin 
$25,000 in compensatory damages 
and $130,000 in punitive damages. 
The trial court granted Le Marc's 
motion for remittitur which 
reduced the punitive damage 
award to $75,000. The Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed the compensatory damage 
award but held that the punitive 
damage award should have been 
vacated because the jury was not 
instructed as to the proper standard 
of proof for punitive damages. 
The case was retried on the sole 
issue of punitive damages and an 
award was returned for Valentin in 
the amount of $700,000. Le 
Marc's motions for a new trial, 
judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and remittitur were all 
denied by the trial court. Le 
Marc's appealed and the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland issued a writ 
of certiorari. 
In justifying the new standard 
set forth in Le Marc's, the court 
reviewed a series of defamation 
actions decided shortly after the 
United States Supreme Court's 
1964 landmark decision, New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964). Le Marc's, 359 Md. 
at 650, 709 A.2d at 1225. In 
Sullivan, the Court explained that 
a public figure must first establish 
"that the defendant acted with 
actual malice, defined as 
knowledge that [the defamatory 
statement] was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not." Id. (citing New 
York Times Co., 376 U.S. 254). 
In Marchesi v. Franchino, 283 
Md. 131,387 A.2d 1129 (1978), a 
defamation action decided after 
Sullivan, the Mary land common 
law standard set forth allowed 
pumtive damages where the 
plaintiff could prove that the 
defamatory statement was made 
with knowledge of its falsity or 
with reckless disregard for the 
truth. Le Marc's, 359 Md. at 651, 
709 A.2d at 1225. However, 
actual malice, including ill-will, 
spite, hatred or intent to injure, 
was not sufficient to support such 
a claim. Id. (citing Marchesi, 283 
Md. 131,387 A.2d 1129). 
The court then reviewed the 
Maryland standard for allowing 
punitive damages in tort actions 
other than defamation. In Owens-
Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 
601 A.2d 633 (1992), a products 
liability action addressing the 
recovery of pvnitive damages, the 
court held that punitive damages 
were appropriate where the 
plaintiff could prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the 
defendant's actions were 
motivated by actual malice. Le 
Marc's, 359 Md. at 651-52, 709 
A.2d at 1225-26. Moreover, the 
court held that the plaintiff must 
prove the defendant had actual 
knowledge of a particular defect 
and that "armed with this actual 
knowledge, the defendant 
consciously or deliberately 
disregarded the potential harm to 
consumers." Id. at 651-52, 709 
A.2d at 1226 (citing Zenobia, 325 
Md. at 463,601 A.2d 633). 
Following Zenobia, the court 
of appeals required that with 
respect to tort actions, punitive 
damage awards were to be based 
upon knowing and deliberate 
wrongdoing where the defendant 
had actual knowledge of the falsity 
of a particular defamatory 
statement. Id at 652, 709 A.2d at 
1226. Applying the same standard 
to defamation actions, the court 
further clarified and refined the 
decisions following Zenobia by 
requiring that an award for 
punitive damages be based upon 
proof that a defamatory statement 
was made with the requisite mens 
real or actual knowledge of its 
falsity. Id. at 652-53, 709 A.2d at 
1226. Subsequent decisions then 
limited the recovery of punitive 
damages to only those situations 
when the defendant had actual 
knowledge that a particular 
defamatory statement was false. 
In the court's most recent 
opinion similar to the instant case, 
Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, 337 
Md. 216, 652 A.2d 1117 (1995), a 
fraud and deceit action, the court 
held that reckless indifference for 
the truth was not the same thing as 
Recent Developments 
having actual knowledge of the 
falsity. Le Marc's, 359 Md. at 
654, 709 A.2d at 1227. 
Furthermore, while reckless 
indifference does "encompass a 
level of actual knowledge," it does 
not rise to the level "sufficient to 
satisfy the actual knowledge of 
falsity required for pumtive 
damages." Id. The Le Marc's 
court concluded that the holding in 
Ellerin reinforced the notion that 
actual knowledge of the falsity was 
the appropriate standard for 
awarding punitive damages in 
defamation cases. Id. As a matter 
of law, reckless disregard was 
rej ected as the standard for the 
award of punitive damages. Id. 
(citing Ellerin, 337 Md. at 235, 
652 A.2d 1117). 
In dissent, Judge Bell 
disagreed with the majority'S new 
ruling, which altered the previous 
common law standard articulated 
in Marchesi. Id. at 656, 709 A.2d 
at 1228. Judge Bell argued that 
the decision might have the effect 
to "insulate certain reprehensible 
conduct from proper punishment." 
/d. Conduct in which the 
defendant acts with "reckless 
indifference" is no better than 
similar conduct in which the 
defendant acts with "actual 
knowledge." Id at 658, 709 A.2d 
at 1229. Furthermore, Judge Bell 
suggested that the damage to the 
person wronged is not less 
reproachable simply because a 
defendant knows that what he is 
saying is false than if made 
without that certainty of the truth. 
Id. Lastly, Judge Bell stated that 
what disturbed him most about the 
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 59 
Recent Developments 
majority's decision was that "it 
simply will not be important to 
ensure that what is communicated 
about another person is true." Id. 
In Le Marc's Management 
Corp. v. Valentin, the court of 
appeals articulated a new standard 
for punitive damage awards in 
defamation actions. In order to 
recover pumtIve damages, a 
plaintiff must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the 
defamer knew that the statement 
was false. Judge Bell argued that 
perhaps the majority drew too fine 
a distinction between actual 
knowledge and reckless 
indifference. Nevertheless, 
considering the public outrage in 
recent years over the exorbitant 
jury awards in tort actions, the 
majority's decision to tighten the 
standard by which plaintiffs can 
seek monetary damage claims in 
defamation actions will likely be 
viewed as a positive public policy 
choice. Perhaps the legislature 
might seriously consider adopting 
the court's new common-law 
standard. 
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